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SITUATION II 
FORCE SHORT OF WAR: BLOCKADE AND 
OCCUPATION IN TIM.E OF PEACE 
There are strained relations between states M 
and N. .Armed land and naval forces of state N 
enter the jurisdiction of state M without declara-
tion of war and there claim the rights to which a 
military occupant would be entitled. In state M, 
states S and T, by virtue of treaty agreement with 
state M, have special rights in respect to exemption 
of persons and property from local jurisdiction. 
State N announces a pacific blockade of the coasts 
and ports of state M. 
(a) In its regular voyage the Safa, a freighter 
la\vfully flying the flag of state S, with a cargo of 
munitions, is about to enter port 0 of state M 
when summoned by radio from an aircraft to lie 
to for 24 hours or until a cruiser of state N arrives 
to visit and search the Safa. The Safa asks aid 
and instructions from the Sogu, a vessel of war of 
state S \vhich is in port. What action should the 
commander of the Sogtt take~ 
(b) .A commercial aircraft, the T-21, registered 
in state T, is on the following day, when entering 
port 0, ordered by the N oan, a cruiser of state N, 
to land at a nearby airport, which is in the control 
of forces of N, in order that its identity and right 
to pass may be established. The T-21 continues 
its flight toward port 0 and is fired upon by the 
N oan and damaged so that it is obliged to land on 
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the beach near the Taf~t, a cruiser of state T. The 
Noa?L continues to fire upon the T-21. What ac-
tion should the co1nmander of the Taf~t take~ 
(c) Under the treaty, the consul of state T has 
con1plete jurisdiction over nationals of state T 
at 1\iount, a city of state M up a river and 150 
n1iles from the coast. Later the Taf~t anchors off 
nfount. The la11d and air forces of state N seize 
the city and order two nationals of state T, accused 
of a crime against citizens of state nf to be turned 
over to authorities of N for trial. The consul of 
state T dema11ds that they be turned over to him, 
and whe11 the allthorities of N demand the two na-
tionals fro111 state l\1:, the consul requests the aid of 
the commander of the Tafu in obtaining and trying 
the accused. What action should the comn1ander 
of the Taf~t tal{e ~ 
SOLUTION 
(a) If the airplane is still with the Safa, the 
commander of the Sog~t shotlld direct the Safa to 
lie to, should proceed to the Safa to protect it, and 
should notify the con1mander of the N forces that 
the Safa is a vessel of state S a11d is not to be 
molested, identificatio11 bei11g all that the Sa.fa is 
legally required to furnish the airplane. If the 
airplane has left the Safa, the Sog~t should direct 
the latter to proceed into the port, and, if deemed 
essential for the protection of the Safa, the Sogu 
should accompany it into the port. 
(b) The corm11ander of the Taf~t should warn 
the N oan that if the latter continues to fire upon 
the T-21, he will fire llpon the N oa1~ to force it to 
desist. He should attempt to interpose the Taf~t 
bet,veen the l\7 oan and the airplane with the object 
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of halting the firing and should send out a small 
boat to rescue the survivors of the T-21. 
(c) The commander of the Taf~t should consult 
with the consul of state T at Mount and should 
report the incident to his superiors in the Navy 
Department. A demand for the return of the na-
tionals of state T or a threat of the use of force on 
the part of the commander of the Tafu would not 
be warranted by the facts of this situation. As 
long as no immediate threat to the lives and prop-
·erty of state T nationals is involved, the matter is 
one for diplomatic negotiation between states T 
andN. 
NOTES 
(( Strai1~ed relatio1ts. ))-The strained relations be-
tween states 1\ti and N do not constitllte a state of 
war. War in the legal sense depends for its exist-
€nce not merely upon the presence of an armed 
clash (the objective criterion of 'var) but also upo11 
the intent either of one of the parties to the clash 
or upon the intent of a third party or l)arties ( t~e 
~ubjective criterion). In the past, at least, 'var in 
the legal sense has been a status resulting from 
some sort of a blend of these two criteria, although 
it is to be remembered that legal war may exist 
without the use of force and that all use .of force 
is not war. The anomalies of this situation have 1 
been so great and definition of 'var has become so 
elusive, that strong suggestions are being made 
€ither to eliminate war entirely from the vocabu-
lary of international law, or to make war in the 
legal sense practically synonymous with the use of 
force. In the present situation, however, it is plain 
that though there is an armed clash between states 
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~1 a11d N there is no war. There is no question, 
therefore, of belligerent rights or of neutral rights 
~n the strict legal sense. The situation is obviously 
analogous to the Sino-Japanese conflict which 
began i11 1937. 
N at~tre of the Si1'Lo-J apanese clash.-
1\Iay the present extensive military operations of Japanese 
forces on Chinese soil be explained on the gTound of war ~ 
No declaration of war has been made by either side in the 
conflict, although the Hague Convention o:f 1907, to which 
China and Japan are parties, provides that hostilities should 
not commence without previous and explicit warning to the 
other party and notice to neutral Powers. The exercise of 
belligerent rights of blockade, visit, search and capture have 
not been resorted to by either side. Diplomatic relations 
have not been broken off although the heads of missions re-
tired after the fall of Nanking. Consuls generally remain 
at their posts and commercial intercourse has continued, al-
though naturally on a much reduced scale. On the other 
hand, extensive military operations have been in progress 
between the Japanese and Chinese armies since early July, 
1937. Something like a million troops are said to be engaged 
on both sides, and something over thirty-five warships have 
taken part in the operations. Bombardments by warships, 
heavy artillery and 'var planes have been extensive and de-
structive to life and property. As early as August 25 Ad-
miral Hasegawa declared a blockade of certain Chinese coasts 
against Chinese vessels, and Chinese vessels running the 
blockade have been captured and sunk. Provisional govern-
ments in the nature of military governments supported by 
armed forces have been set up by Japan in the conquered 
territory. Neutrals have been warned to withdraw from 
areas of hostilities, and encroachments have been made by 
Japanese forces upon the foreign settlement areas. (L. H. 
'Voolsey, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, 
p. 317.) 
Report of the Ni1Le Power B1·ussels Co1tfer-
e1Lce.-Follo\ving is the text of the report adopted 
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on November 24, 1937, by the Nine Power Confer-
ence at Brussels', Belgium: 
"The Conference at Brussels 'vas assembled pursuant to 
an invitation extended by the Belgian Government at the 
request of His ~1ajesty's Government in the United King-
dom with the approval of the American Government. It 
held its opening session on November 3, 1937. The Confer-
ence has now reached a point at which it appears desirable 
to record the essential phases of its work. 
"In the winter of 1921-22 there were signed at \Vashing-
ton a group of inter related treaties and agreements of 
which the Nine Power Treaty regarding principles and 
policies to be followed in matters concerning China consti-
tuted one of the most in1portant units. These treaties and 
agreements were the result of careful deliberation and were 
entered into freely. They were designed primarily to bring 
about conditions of stability and security in the Pacific area. 
"The Nine Po,ver Treaty stipulates in Article one that-
" 'The Contracting Powers, other than China agree : 
" ' ( 1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and 
the territorial and administrative integrity of China; 
" ' ( 2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed 
opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself 
an effective and stable government; 
"' (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectu-
ally establishing and maintaining the princi pie of equal 
opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations 
throughout the territory of China; 
" ' ( 4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in 
China in order to seek special rights or privileges which 
would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly 
States, and fro1n countenancing action inimical to the secur-
ity of such States.' 
"Under and in the light of these undertakings and of the 
provisions contained in the other treaties, the situation in 
the Pacific area was for a decade characterized by a sub-
stantial measure of stability, with considerable progress 
towards the other objectives envisaged in the treaties. In 
recent years there have come a series of conflicts between 
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Japan and China, and these conflicts have culminated in the 
hostilities now in progress. 
"The Conference at Brussels was called for the purpose, 
as set forth in the terms of the invitation 'of examining in 
conformity "rith Article seven of that treaty, the situation 
in the Far East and of studying peaceable means of hasten-
ing an end of the regrettable conflict which prevails there.' 
'Vith the exception of Japan, all of the signatories and ad-
herents to the Nine Po,ver Treaty of February 6, 1922 ac-
cepted the invitation and sent representatives to Brussels 
for the purpose stated in the invitation. 
"The Chinese Government, attending the Conference and 
participating in its deliberations, has communicated with the 
other parties to the Nine Power Treaty in conformity 'vith 
Article 7 of that treaty. It has stated here that its present 
1nilitary operations are purely in resistance to armed in-
vasion of China by Japan. It has declared its 'villingness 
to accept a peace based upon the principles of the Nine 
Po,ver Treaty and to collaborate 'vholeheartedly with the 
other powers in support o£ the principle of the sanctity of 
treaties. 
"The Japanese Government in replying with regret that 
it 'Yas not able to accept the invitation to the Conference 
affirmed that 'the action of Japan in China is a measure 
of self defense 'vhich she has been compelled to take in the 
face of China's fierce anti Japanese policy and practice and 
especially by her provocative action in resorting to force of 
arms; and consequently it lies, as has been declared already 
by the Imperial Government, outside the purvie'v of the 
Nine Po"·er Treaty'; and advanced the vie'v that an attempt 
to seek a solution at a gathering of so many powers 'would 
only serve to complicate the situation still further and to 
put serious obstacles in the path of a just and proper 
solution'. 
"On November 7, 1937 the Conference sent through the 
Belgian Government to the Japanese Government a com-
m,unication in the course of 'vhich the Conference inquired 
'vhether the Japanese Government would be willing to de-
pute a representative or representatives to exchange views 
with representatives of a small number of po"Ters to be 
chosen for that purpose, the exchange of vie,vs to take place 
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within the framework of the Nine Po,ver Treaty and in con-
fornlity with the provisions of that treaty, toward throwing 
further light on points of difference and facilitating a settle-
ment of the Sino-Japanese conflict. In that communication 
the representatives of the states met at Brussels, expressed 
their earnest desire that peaceful settlement be achieved. 
"To that communication the Japanese Government replied 
in a communication of November 12, 1937 stating that it 
could not do otherwise than maintain its previously ex-
pressed point of view that the present action of Japan in 
her relations with China was a measure of self defense and 
did not come within the scope of the Nine Power Treaty; 
that only an effort between the two parties would constitute 
a means of securing the most just and the most equitable 
settlement, and that the intervention of a collective organ 
such as the Conference would merely excite public opinion 
in the two countries and make it more difficult to reach a 
solution satisfactory to all. 
"On November 15 the Conference adopted a declaration 
in the course of which it affirmed that the representatives 
of the Union of South Africa, the United States of America, 
Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, China, France, the 
United Kingdom, India, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Portugal, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
'* * * consider this conflict of concern in fact to all 
countries party to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington 
of 1922 and to all countries party to the Pact of Paris of 
1928 and of concern in fact to all countries members of 
the family of nations.' 
"In the presence of this difference between the views of 
the Conference and of the Japanese Government there now 
appears to be no opportunity at this time for the Confer-
ence to carry out its terms of reference insofar as they relate 
to entering into discussions with Japan towards bringing 
about peace by agreement. The Conference therefore is 
concluding this phase of its work and at this moment of 
going into recess adopts a further declaration of its views. 
"The text of the communication sent to the Japanese 
Government on November 7, 1937 reads as follows: 
" 'The representatives of the states met in Brussels on 
November 3, last, have taken cognizance of the reply which 
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the Japanese Governn1ent sent in of October 27 to the in-
vitation of the Belgian Government, and the statement 
which accompanied this reply. 
" 'In these documents the I1nperial Government states that 
it cherishes no territorial ambitions in respect of China and 
that on the contrary it sincerely desires "to assist in the 
1naterial and moral development of the Chinese nation", 
that it also desires "to promote cultural and economic co-
operation" 'vith the foreign powers in China and that it 
intends furthermore scrupulously "to respect foreign rights 
and interest in that country." 
" 'The points referred to in this declaration are among the 
fundamental principles of the Treaty of Washington of 
February 6, 1922 (The Nine Power Treaty). The repre-
sentatives of the states parties to this treaty have taken note 
of the declarations of the Imperial Government in this 
· respect. 
" 'The Imperial Government moreover denies that there 
can be any question of a violation of the Nine Power Treaty 
by Japan and it :formulates a number o:f complaints against 
the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government for its 
part contends that there has been violation, denies the 
charges of the Japanese Government and, in turn, makes 
complaint against Japan. 
"'The treaty has made provision :for just such a situation. 
It should be borne in mind that the exchange of views tak-
ing place in Brussels is based essentially on these provisions 
and constitutes "full and frank communication" as envis-
aged in Article VII. This Conference is being held with a 
view to assisting in the resolving by peaceful means of a 
conflict btween parties to the treaty. 
" 'One of the parties to the present conflict, China, is rep-
resented at the Conference and has affirmed its willingness 
:fully to cooperate in its work. 
"'The Conference regrets the absence of the other party, 
Japan, 'vhose cooperation is most desirable. 
" 'The Imperial Government states that it is "firmly con-
vinced that an attempt to seek a solution at a gathering of 
so many powers whose interests in East Asia are of varying 
degree, or who have practically no interests there at all, 
'viii only serve to complicate the situation still further and 
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to put serious obstacles in the path of a just and proper 
solution." 
" 'It should be pointed out that all of these powers which 
are parties to the treaty are, under the terms of this in-
-strument, entitled to exercise the rights which the treaty 
confers upon then1 ; that all powers which have interests in 
the Far East are concerned regarding the present hostilities; 
-and that the whole world is solicitous with regard to the 
effect of these hostilities on the peace and security of the 
members of the family of nations. 
" 'However, the representatives of the states met at Brus-
sels believe that it may be possible to allay Japan's mis-
givings referred to above; they would be glad to know 
whether the Imperial Government would be disposed to de-
pute a representative or representatives to exchange views 
with representatives of a small number of powers to be 
.chosen for that purpose. Such an exchange of views would 
take place within the framework of the Nine Power Treaty 
and in conformity with the provisions of that treaty. Its 
aims would be to throw further light on the various points 
referred to above and to facilitate a settlen1ent of the con-
-flict. Regretting the continuation of hostilities, being 
firmly convinced that a peaceful settlement is alone capable 
of insuring a lasting and constructive solution of the pres-
ent conflict, and having confidence in the efficacy of methods 
Df conciliation, the representatives of the states met at 
Brussels earnestly desire that such a settlement may be 
achieved. 
"'The states represented at the Conference would be very 
glad to know as soon as possible the attitude of the Imperial 
Government towards this proposal.' 
"The text of the declaration adopted by the Conference 
November 24, 1937 reads as follows : 
"'The Nine Power Treaty is a conspicuous example of 
numerous international instruments by which the nations 
of the world enunciate certain principles and accept certain 
self denunciatory rules in their conduct with each other 
solemnly undertaking to respect the sovereignty of other 
nations, to refrain from seeking political or economic dom-
ination of other nations, and to abstain from interference in 
their internal affairs. 
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" 'These international instruments constitute a fra1nework 
within '-vhich international security and international peace 
are intended to be safeguarded without resort to arms and 
within 'vhich international relationships should subsist on 
the basis of n1utual trust, good will and beneficial trade and 
financial relations. 
" 'It must be recognized that whenever armed force is 
employed in disregard of these principles the whole struc-
ture of international relations based upon the safeguards 
provided by treaties is disturbed. Nations are then com-
pelled to seek security in ever increasing arn1a1nents. 
There is created everywhere a feeling of uncertainty and 
insecurity. The validity of these principles cannot be 
destroyed by force, their universal applicability cannot be 
denied and indispensability to civilization and progress 
cannot be gainsaid. 
" 'It 'vas in accordance 'vith these principles that this 
Conference was called in Brussels for the purpose, as set 
forth in the terms of the invitation issued by the Belgian 
Government "of examining in conformity with article seven 
of the Nine Po,ver Treaty, the situation in the Far East and 
of studying peaceable 1neans of hastening an end of the 
regrettable conflict which prevails there". 
" 'Since its opening session on November 3rd the Con-
ference has continuously striven to promote conciliation and 
has endeavored to secure the cooperation of the Japanese 
Government in the hope of arresting hostilities and bring-
ing about a settlement. 
" 'The Conference is convinced that force cannot provide 
just and lasting solution for disputes between nations. It 
continues to believe that it would be to the i1nmediate and the 
ultimate interest of both parties to the present dispute to 
a vail themscl Yes of the assistance of others in an effort to 
bring hostilities to an early end as a necessary preli1ninary 
to the achievement of a general and lasting settlement. It 
further believes that a satisfactory sett1ement cannot be 
achieved by direct negotiation bet,-veen the parties to the 
conflict alone and that only by consultation 'vith other 
po,vers principally concerned can there be achieved an 
agreement the terms of which will be just, generally accept-
able and likely to endure. 
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"'This Conference strongly reaffirms the principles of the 
Nine Power Treaty as being among the basic principles 
which are essential to world peace and orderly progressive 
development of national and international life. 
"'The Conference believes that a prompt suspension of 
hostilities in the Far East would be in the best interests not 
only of China and Japan but of all nations. With each 
day's continuance of the conflict the loss in lives and prop-
erty increases and the ultimate solution of the conflict be-
eoines Inore difficult. 
" 'The Conferenec therefore strongly urges that hostilities 
be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes. 
" 'The Conference believes that no possible step to bring 
about by peaceful processes a just settlement of the conflict 
should be overlooked or omitted. 
" 'In order to allow time for participating governments 
to exchange views and further explore all peaceful methods 
by which a just settlement of the dispute may be attained 
consistently 'vith the principles of the Nine Power Treaty 
and in conformity with the objectives of that treaty the 
Conference deems it advisable temporarily to suspend its 
sittings. The conflict in the Far East remains, however, a 
matter of concern to all the powers assembled at Brussels-
by virtue of co1nmitments in the Nine Power Treaty or of 
.special interest in the Far East-and especially to those 
most inunediately and directly affected by conditions and 
.events in the Far East. Those of them that are parties to 
the Nine Po"Ter Treaty have expressly adopted a policy de-
signed to stabilize conditions in the Far East and, to that 
end, are bound by the provisions of that treaty, outstanding 
.among w·hich are those of articles 1 and 7. 
" 'The Conference will be called together again whenever 
i.ts chair1nan or any t.'vo of its members shall have reported 
that they consider that its deliberations can be ad van-
tageously resumed.' " 
Both China and Italy requested that statements of posi-
tion they made should be considered as integral parts of the 
report. (Press Releases, Vol. XVII, No. 426.) 
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Policy of the Ur~ited States-GeneTal.-
At his press conference on August _17, 1937 the Secretary 
of State announced that (1) legislative action to n1ake avail-
able funds for purposes of emergency relief necessitated by 
the situation in the Far East had been asked and that (2) 
this Govern1nent had given orders for a regiment of ma-
rines to prepare to proceed to Shanghai. The Secretary 
then discussed at some length the principles of policy on 
"\vhich this Government "\vas proceeding. 
The situation in Shanghai is in many respects unique. 
Shanghai is a great cosmopolitan center, with a population 
of over three 1nillion, a port which has been developed by 
the nationals of many countries, at which there have pre-
vailed 1nutually advantageous contacts of all types and 
varieties between and among the Chinese and people of 
ahnost all other countries of the world. At Shanghai there 
exists a multiplicity of rights and interests "\vhich are of in-
evitable concern to many countries, including the United 
States. 
In the present situation, the American Government is en-
gaged in facilitating in every way possible an orderly and 
safe removal of An1erican citizens from areas "~here there 
is special danger. Further, it is the policy of the American 
Government to afford its nationals appropriate protection, 
primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled elements. For 
that purpose it has for Inany years Inaintained s1nall detach-
ments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is 
sending the present small reinforcement. These armed 
forces there have no mission of aggression. It is their func-
tion to be of assistance to,,ard maintenance of order and 
security. It has been the desire and the intention of the 
American Govern1nent to remove these forces when per-
formance of their function of protection is no longer called 
for. and such remains its desire and expectation. 
The issues and proble1ns which are of concern to this 
Govern1nent in the present situation in the Pacific area go 
far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of 
the nationals and interests of the United States. The con-
ditions which prevail in that area are intimately connected 
·with and have a direct and fundan1ental relationship to the 
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general principles of policy to which attention 'vas called 
in the statement of July 16, which statement has evoked 
expressions of approval from more than 50 governments. 
This Government is firmly of the opinion that the principle 
summarized in that statement should effectively govern in-
ternational relationships. 
When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world 
the threat or the existence of serious hostilities, the matter 
is of concern to all nations. 'Vithout attempting to pass 
judgment regarding the merits of the controversy, we appeal 
to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We urge that 
they settle their differences in accordance with principles 
which, in the opinion not alone of our people but of most 
peoples of the world, should govern in international rela-
tionships. We consider applicable throughout the world, 
in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles set forth in 
the statement of July 16. That statement of princples is 
comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles em-
bodied in many treaties, including the Washington Con-
ference treaties and the I\::ellogg-Briand Pact of Paris. 
From the beginning of the present controversy in the 
Far East, 've have been urging upon both the Chinese and 
the Japanese Governments the importance of refraining 
from hostilities and of maintaining peace. vVe have been 
participating constantly in consultation with interested 
governn1ents directed toward peaceful adjustment. This 
Government does not believe in political alliances or entan-
glements, nor does it believe in extreme isolation. It does 
believe in international cooperation for the purpose of seek-
ing through pacific methods the achieven1ent of those objee-
tives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of 
our ''ell-defined attitude and policies, and "rithin the range 
thereof, this Government is giving most solicitous attention 
to every phase of the Far Eastern situation, to,vard safe-
guarding the lives or welfare of our people and making 
effective the policies-especially the policy of peace-in 
which this country believes and to which it is committed. 
This Government is endeavoring to see kept alive, 
strengthened, and revitalized, in reference to the Pacific 
area and to all the world, these fundan1ental princi pies. 
(Press Releases, Vol. XVII, No. 413.) 
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Self-help and strai1~ed relatio1~s-Reprisals.­
The use of force 'vithout \var is legal but few crys-
tallized rules exist to govern the relations of the 
combatants and the relatio11s bet,veen these and 
third states. In theory, due to the absence of an 
organized international gover11111ent with the power 
to enforce law, states have been legally justified in 
taking the law into their O\Vn hands and e1nploying 
force for the defense of their rights. This is the 
system (or lack of system) kno\vn as Self-Help. 
According to the theory there is a \vell defined set 
of rigl1ts and duties belongli1g to the members of 
the inter11ational com111unity; these members, in the 
absence of international agencies, are to decide 
what their rigl1ts and duties are and are author-
ized to apply measures of coercion i11 the execution 
of the la\v. If all states were n1ore or less equal, 
this system might operate in line with the theory, 
but in l)ractice, because of the vast i11equalities be-
tween the strengths of various nations, it has led 
to grave abuses, and what should have been legal 
n1easures of law enforcement turn otlt to be in fact 
mea11s for political domination and control by the 
stronger against the weal{er. The virtual collapse 
of the theory in operation is due 11ot only to state 
inequality but also to the fact that each state has 
bee11 its own prosecutor, judge and enforcing agent. 
The la\v on this subject of Self-Help is therefore 
\Voefully deficient. It has had to trail alo11g after 
the practice of the great powers tidying up in hap-
hazard fashion the actions of strong states \Vhich 
have claimed to be enforcing their legal rights and 
\Vl1ich have not been called to account except be-
latedly by relatively fe\v publicists and students. 
Judges and la\v interpretators for the 111ost part 
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have accepted the fact of the use of force because 
of necessity and have thus built up a certain 
amount of pragmatic law based 1nainly on the de 
facto use of power a11d not on the basis of the genu-
ii1e mutual self-interest of states in general. 
Probably the most commo11 a11d general term for 
these measures of Self-Help which do not involve 
war, is that of reprisal, though it is to be remem-
bered that 'var itself is often justified as the ulti-
Ina te reprisal. Theoretically, a reprisal is a legal 
act of redress performed by a state to obtain satis-
faction for an injury received. Force is 110t justi-
fied legally unless there has been a refusal to make 
redress after dtle notice. .As above indicated, how-
ever, these allegedly lega~ measures are usually 
highly colored by political motives and objectives, 
so that while a great state has'' justified'' a reprisal 
upon the grounds of self-help, actually the venture 
has most ofte11 been of very dubious legality, the 
· la'v serving chiefly as a thin veneer to cover what 
in essence was an illegal act. 
Reprisals n1ay take several forms, such as mili-
tary occupation, naval bombardment, attacks upon 
co1nmerce, en1bargo, boycott, and pacific blockade. 
The history of reprisals and an analysis of their 
employment are admirably described in Hind-
n1arsh, A. E. ''Force in Peace.'' The sanctions out-
lined in Article 16 of the League of Nations Cove-
nant are designed to be collective reprisals, and to 
be of a legal rather than a political nature, in that 
they were to be employed by a community agency 
after a careful study. Some of these pl"oblems 
'vere thoroughly studied in the Naval War College 
Situations in 1932, pages 89 to 135. 
1675R3-40-5 
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Pacific blockade.-The United States has C011-
sistently denied tl1e legality of interference with 
vessels of third states by a squadron applying a 
pacific blocl{ade. .As there is no war and therefore 
no belligere11t rights, legally there can be no visit 
and search, but a blockading vessel has the right to 
identify ships attempting to pass the blockade. 
It may be necessary that the blockading forces approach, 
'vitl1in the specific area of effective 1naintenance of the block-
ade, vessels of third states, for the purpose of verification of 
their right to fly the flag. (Naval \¥ ar College Situations, 
1932, p. 95.) 
Pacific bla.ckade i1~ the Si1~o-J apa1~ese conflict.-
~1ore important than these subsidiary operations was 
the navy's part in hindering the replenishn1ent fron1 abroad 
of Chinese stocks of n1ilitary equipn1ent. A "pacific block-
ade"-proclaimed on August _25 by the commander of the 
Japanese China fleet-for territory bet,veen the mouth of 
the Yangtze and S".,.ato'v 'vas extended on September 5 to 
include virtually the entire Chinese coast, from the Man-
churian border to Pakhoi in the south. Since Japan, not 
being legally at war, did not possess the right of a bel-
ligerent to intercept shipn1ents of contraband in neutral 
ships, the blockade 'vas directed against Chinese vessels 
alone. \Vhile a naval spokes1nan at Shanghai threatened 
to pree1npt such cargoes if carried in non-Chinese craft~ 
1,okyo declared that the "peaceful commerce" of third po'v-
ers would not be molested. This term, ho,vever, was not 
construed to cover foreign vessels specifically employed for 
the purpose of carrying 'var supplies to the Chinese. Ap-
parently reluctant to challenge the doubtful legality of this 
exception, both the United States and Great Britain took 
1neasures to avoid incidents in the blockaded zone. British 
shipping 'vas advised that, in the absence of a British war-
ship, Japanese naval officers should be permitted to board 
ship and verify certificates of registry-a procedure which 
'vould tend to prevent use of the British flag as a ruse by 
Chinese Yessels. Once foreign countries had acquiesced to 
PACIFIC BLOCKADE 59 
this extent in the Japanese procedure, Tokyo authorities 
let it be known that "for the present" there would be no 
interference ·with any foreign shipping. This course was 
probably adopted because it was believed that the volume 
of military supplies shipped by sea to China, after these 
government warnings, would be too small to warrant the 
risk of foreign complications over their seizure. (Foreign 
Policy Reports, l\fay 15, 1938, p. 55.) 
Following a conference with the Secretary of State and 
the Chairman of the United States l\1aritime Commission, 
the President today, Septe1nber 14, 1937, issued the fol-
lov.-"ing state1nent: 
"~ierchant vessels o"~ned by the Govern1nent of the U nitecl 
States 'vill not hereafter, until further notice, be permitted 
to transport to China or Japan any of the arn1s, ammuni-
tion, or implements of "\Yar 'vhich were listed in the Presi-
dent's prochunation of l\fay 1, 1937. 
"Any other 1nerchant vessels, flying the A1nerican flag, 
"~hich atten1pt to transport any of the listed articles to 
China or Japan ""'ill, until further notice, do so at their 
ow·n risk. 
"The question of applying the Neutrality Act re1nan1s 
in statu quo, the Government policy remaining on a 24-
hour basis." 
ANNOUNCHMENT 
The conflict in the Far East has resulted in the creation 
of a danger zone along the coast of China which makes it 
dangerous for American merchant vessels to operate in the 
adjacent waters. 
The Japanese authorities have announced a blockade of 
the entire coast from Chin,vangtao to Pakhoi against the 
entrance or egress of Chinese shipping. 
The Chinese authorities have announced their intention, 
in view of the blockade, to take appropriate action against 
all Japanese naval vessels along the Chinese coast and 
have requested that naval and merchant vessels of third 
pnwers avoid proxi1nity to ,Japanese naval vessels nnd 1nili-
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tary transports and have their respective national colors 
painted on their top decks in a conspicuous 1nanner. 
The Chinese authorities have also announced the fol-
lo,ving: 
(a) The n1outh of ~fin J(iang River in Fukien Province 
has been closed to navigation, and all shipping through that 
place has been suspended as of Septe1nber 4. 
(b) Beginning ·Septe1nber 9 no foreign 1nerchant vessels 
'vill be pern1itted to navigate at night in 'vaters between 
Bocca Tigris forts and Canton. (Press Releases, 'T ol. 
X'TII, No. 416.) 
The international law gover1~·i1~g rezJrisals-
Four general rules.-Tl1e rules gover11ing the con-
duct of reprisals and the relations bet\veen the con-
testants and third states have never bee11 clearly 
developed, reprisals constituting an extremely 
foggy segment of international la\v. Ollt of the 
practice of reprisals both before 1914 and in these 
later days of ''undeclared \vars, '' certain general 
rules, ho\vever, do emerge. These are shadovvy, it 
is true, and their listing is not in the least 111eant to 
be definitive. Four, hovvever, can be discerned: 
(1) The state engaging in reprisals is entitled to 
take those measures which are reasonably related 
to the end in vievv, and vvhich do not interfere lin-
reasonably vvith the rights of third states in \vhat, 
~fter all, is still technically a state of peace. The 
meaning of the word ''reasonable'' is subject to 
legal determination. The law or the judge apply-
ing the law 1nust talre into account the fact that 
the state engaged in a reprisal partaking of the 
nature of force USllally l1as a definite military or 
naval objective. Tl1ose acts \vhich are connected 
with tl1e attainment of this end must be condoned 
by third states to a certain exte11t; these latter must 
be I)repared to permit son1e interfere11ce vvi th their 
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normal peace tin1e rights, and though they do not 
have to allo'v the exercise of belligei-.ent rights, they 
must recognize some modification in the regular 
la,vs of peace. This principle may seem vague and 
abstract, but in concrete situations it is not too diffi-
cult to apply, for in these it is usually not impos-
sible to make a compromise which gra11ts the state 
applying force sufficient latitude for the attain-
ment of its object but which does not destroy com-
pletely the rights of third parties. An exan1ple of 
such a compromise is to be found in pacific block-
ade, where the vessels of third states must identify 
themselves to ships of the blockading force. This 
adjustment of the needs of the military and naval 
forces of the state engaged in reprisals with the 
rights of third states is all-important, and its 
achievement along the lines of reasonable compro-
mise is of paramount significance in any discussion 
of this topic. 
(2) Despite the absence of formal agreement on 
this 1natter, there has been a distinct trend toward 
applying the laws of war to the conduct of hostili-
ties between the parties in these non-war situations. 
The states engaged in the dispute are not bellig-" 
erents btlt they have come to be regarded as being 
to some extent under the laws of belligerency. 
Where third states are concei-.ned this means that 
the usual war-time doctrine of "military neces-
sity" will be the criterion for the responsibility for 
damages committed by either contestant. r In the 
Sino-Japanese conflict, for instance, it has been 
interesting to note ho'v third powers, though not 
admitting the existence of war, have yet attempted 
to hold both Japan and China responsible for 
injuries as if there were a war. Foreigners' loss 
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of life a11d property have brought a den1and for 
reparation whe11ever ·such loss has seemed Ullcou-
nected \vith "military necessity~" 
(3) Contestants in a non-\var use of force 1nust 
therefore pay damages on a \Yar basis, a rule 
obviotlsly and immediately related to the one pre-
ceding. Sometimes in the past, damages have not 
been paid, as in the case of the bombardment of 
Greytown in 1854 ( 4 Court of Claims Report 54:-3, 
Perri1~ ·v. the U~nited States), but the failure of the 
United States in this instance does 11ot constitute 
a precedent, for in many other cases payme11t has 
bee11 111ade for damages \vhich \vere 11ot tl1e result 
of the acutal needs of "'varfare." In his a1·tielP, 
''Responsibility for Damages to Persons a11d Prop-
erty of Aliens in Undeclared War'' (Proceedings 
of the American Society of Inter11ational J__;a\Y, 
1938, pp. 127 to 140), Professor Clyde E11gleto11 
1nal{es a thoroughgoing survey of the precedents 011 
this point. 
( 4) Because there is no \var in the legal sense, 
there is no neutrality during a period of reprisals. 
Third states accept inconvenience and interfere11ce, 
but they are not called upon to enforce neutral 
obligations, nor must they concede the full exercise 
of belligerent rights. 
This entlmeration of alleged rules may 11ot really 
be la\v at all becat1se the status of reprisals is basi-
cally so a11omalous. On the one hand, there is 
legally peace and on the other, there is the employ-
ment of force \Vhich brings many war-like elen1ents 
into the troubled pict11re. That the l"esult legally 
is considerable confusio11 is not surprising, but a 
semblance of order may be mai11tained if reason-
able con1pron1ises arc 1nade on the basis of the fore-
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going outline. A stronger international law of 
peace and a better organized world of states would 
not tolerate such a hazy assemblage of alleged prin-
ciples based llpon a part-peace, part-war founda-
tion, but for the present all that can be done is to 
salvage son1ething in the way of order out of this 
unsatisfactory situation. 
As above suggested, third parties have attempted 
to l1old both Japan and China to the laws of war 
during the Far Eastern conflict. Both these pow-
ers seem to have admitted responsibility under the 
laws of war and have paid damages accordingly. 
The most notable instance of this is the case of the 
Panay) the full story of which is printed in the ap-
pendix to this volume. The Japanese paid the 
United States $2,214,007.36 for the sinking of the ' 
Panay (Press Releases, Vol. XVIII, No. 443, p. 
410), vvhile the Chinese Government paid the 
United States $264,887.47 as indemnification for 
perso11al injuries sustained as a result of the bomb-
ing of the S. S. P1/0es1~dent Hoover on August 30, 
1937. (Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 468, p. 190.) 
American attit~tde toward J apa1~ese conduct of 
host1~lt:ties.-Since the renewal of the fighting be-
tween China and Japan in the Summer of 1937, 
the American Governme11t, though never conceding 
that a formal war was in progress, has endeavored 
to call Japan to account as if the lavvs of war actu-
ally governed the situation. The American notes 
insist that the principles of the law of war are op-
erative, e. g. in regard to bombing, and that dam-
age or destruction are permissible only when ''The 
objectives of Japanese military operations are lim-
ited strictly to Chinese military agencies and estab-
64 FORCE IN PEACE 
lishments. '' (See the next to the last paragraph of 
the A1nerica11 note printed immediately belo\v.) 
i\Ol\IBING OF NANKING 
Upon instructions of the Secretary of State, the American 
Ambassador at 'Tokyo, l\Ir. Joseph C. Gre".,., delivered a note 
to the l\finister for Foreign Affairs at Tokyo, September 22, 
1937. The note read textually as follows: 
"1'he American Government refers to the statement by the 
commander in chief of the Japanese Third Fleet which was 
handed to the American consul General at Shanghai on Sep-
teinber 19 announcing the project of the Japanese Naval Air 
Force, after 12 o'clock noon of Septe1nber 21, 1937, to resort to 
bombing and other measures of offense in and around the city 
of Nanking and 'Yarning the officials and nationals of third 
po""'ers living there 'to take adequate 1neasures for voluntary 
moving into areas of greater safety.' 
"The American Govern1nent objects both to such jeopardiz-
ing of the lives of its nationals and of noncombatants gen-
erally and to the suggestion that its officials and nationals 
now residing in and around Nanking should withdraw from 
the areas in which they are la,vfully carrying on their legiti-
mate activities. 
"I1nmediately upon being informed of the announcement 
under reference, the A1nerican Government gave instruction 
to the American Ambassador at Tokyo to express to the J ap-
anese Government this Government's concern; and that in-
struction 'vas carried out. On the same day the concern of 
this Govern1nent 'vas expressed by the Acting Secretary of 
State to the Japanese A1nbassador in "\Vashington. 
"This G·overn1nent holds the vie'v that any general bomb-
ing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large popu-
lace engaged in peaceful pursuits is un,varranted and con-
trary to principles of law and of humanity. l\foreover, in 
the present instance the P .. eriod allowed for withdrawal is 
inadequate, and, in view of the wide area over which J apa-
nese bombing operations have prevailed, there can be no 
assurance that even in areas to which American nationals 
and noncombatants might 'vithdraw they would be secure. 
"N othwithstanding the reiterated assurance that 'the 
safety of the lives and property of nationals of friendly 
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powers will be taken into full consideration during the 
projected offensive,' this Government is constrained to ob-
serve that experience has shown that, when and where aerial 
bombing operations are engaged in, no amount of solicitude 
on the part of the authorities responsible therefor is effective 
toward insuring the safety of any persons or any property 
'vithin the area of such operations. 
"Reports of bombing operations by Japanese planes at 
and around Nanking both before and since the issuance of 
the announcement under reference indicate that these opera-
tions almost invariably result in extensive destruction of 
noncombatant life and nonmilitary establishments. 
"In vie·w of the fact that Nanking is the seat of govern-
Inent in China and that there the American Ambassador 
and other agencies of the American Govern1nent carry on 
their essential functions, the American Govern1nent strongly 
objects to the creation of a situation in consequence of which 
the American A1nbassador and other agencies of this Gov-
ernment are confronted with the ·alternative of abandoning 
their establish1nents or being exposed to grave hazards. 
"In the light of the assurances repeatedly given by the 
Japanese Government that the objectives of Japanese mili-
tary operations are limited strictly to 0 hinese military 
agencies and establishments and that the Japanese Govern-
ment has no intention of making non1nilitary property and 
noncombatants the direct objects of attack, and of the J apa-
nese Government's expression of its desire to respect the 
Embassies, warships, and merchant vessels of the powers at 
Nanking, the American Government cannot believe that the 
intimation that the whole Nanking area m.ay be subjected 
to bombing operations represents the considered intent of 
the Japanese Government. 
"The American Government, therefore, reserving all 
rights on its o'vn behalf and on behalf of American Na-
tionals in respect to damages which might result from J apa-
nese military operations in the Nanking area, expresses the 
earnest hope that further bombing in and around the city 
of .Nanking 'vill be a vioded." (Press Releases, Vol. XVII, 
No. 417.) 
66 FORCE I~ PEACE 
A1nerica1~ property in areas of hostility.-
"I am instructed by my Government to bring to Your Ex-
cellency's attention reports and complaints fro1n American 
residents that in the course of recent military operations at 
Nanking, Hangsho'v and other places the Japanese armed 
forces have repeatedly entered American property illegally 
and removed goods and employees and committed other acts 
of depredation against American property which has almost 
invariably been marked by American flags and by notices in 
English, Chinese and Japanese issued by the American au-
thorities and setting forth the American character of the 
property concerned. According to these reports not only 
have Japanese soldiers manifested a complete disregard for 
these notices but they have also in numerous instances torn 
down, burned and otherwise mutilated American flags. I 
a1n directed to impress upon Your Excellency the serious-
ness with which my Government regards such acts and to 
convey its most emphatic protest against them. My Govern-
ment finds it impossible to reconcile the flagrant disregard 
of American rights shown by Japanese troops as above de-
scribed with the assurances contained in Your Excellency's 
note of December 24, 1937, that 'rigid orders have been 
issued to the military, naval and Foreign Office authorities 
to pay * * * greater attention than hitherto to observ-
ance of the instructions that have been repeatedly given 
against infringtjment of, or unwarranted interference with, 
the rights and interests of the United States and other 
third powers.' 
"In view of the fact that a number of these acts are re-
ported as having occurred subsequent to the receipt of the 
aforementioned assurances of the Imperial Japanese Gov-
ernment and inas1nuch as this disregard of American rights 
is reported as still continuing, the American Government ·is 
constrained to observe that the steps which the Japanese 
Government have so far taken seem inadequate to ensure 
that hereafter American nationals, interests and property 
in China shall not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed 
forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities 
or forces 'vhatsoever. l\iy Government must, therefore, re-
quest that the Imperial Japanese Government reenforce the 
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instructions which have already been issued in such a way 
as will serve effectively to prevent the repetition of such 
outrages." 
(Note presented by Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the 
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 17, 1938, 
Press Releases, Vol. XVIII, No. 435.) 
A.rnerican property occ~tpied by Japanese.-
The American Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Joseph C. 
Gre'v, on May 31, 1938, addressed to the Japanese Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, under instruction from the Secretary 
of State, a note reading as follows : 
"The problem of enabling American citizens in China to 
reenter and repossess their properties, from which they have 
been excluded by the Japanese military and of which the 
Japanese military have been and in some cases still are in 
occupation, is giving the Government of the United States 
. . Increasing concern. 
"An illustrative case is that of the property of the Uni-
versity of Shanghai, a large and valuable plant located at 
Shanghai in the Y angtzepoo district. This university has 
been engaged for many years in educational work and is 
jointly o'vned by the Northern and Southern Baptist Mis-
sionary Societies. The pre1nises of the university have been 
under continuous occupation by Japanese military and naval 
units since shortly after the outbreak of hostilities at Shang-
hai in August 1937. It is understood that the premises have 
been used by the Japanese for quartering troops and for 
military offices, and a portion of the campus for stationing 
airplanes and supplementing the runway for airplanes on 
the adjacent golf course which has been converted by the 
Japanese into a military flying field. During the period 
of Japanese occupancy several buildings have been damaged 
and the n1ajority looted. Japanese occupation of the prop-
erty has continued for a period of nine months, notwith-
standing the fact that hostil-ities in this locality long ago 
ceased. Repeated \rritten and oral representations made by 
the An1erican En1bassy at Tokyo to the Japanese Govern-
1nent and by the American Consul General at Shanghai to 
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the Japanese authorities there have not so far resulted in 
bringing about restoration of the pre1nises to the rightful 
o'vners. Recently, representatives of the Baptist missionary 
societies have stressed, on behalf of the six 1nillion Baptists 
in the United .States, the urgent need £or the return to 
their possession of this important 1nissionary educational 
property. 
~•rn various places in the lo,ver Yangtze 'Talley An1erican 
businessmen and 1nissionaries have been prevented by the 
Japanese authorities fro1n returning to their places of busi-
ness and 1nission stations and are denied even casual access 
to their properties. rrhe A1nerican Consul General at 
Shanghai has made applications for passes in behalf of 
several A1nerican fir1ns 'vith in1portant interests in that area 
in order to per1nit the representatives and en1ployees of th~ 
fir1ns to resurne business there, but such applications have 
repeatedly been refused by the Japanese authorities on the 
ground that peace and order have not been sufficiently re-
stored. .This has been the case even 'vhen the applications 
"~ere for visits for the purpose of brief inspection and check-
ing of losses or for the purpose of taking steps to prevent 
further deterioration of their properties, including stocks 
und equipment, during their enforced absence. ~'!any J ap-
anese n1erchants and their families are kno"·n to be in the 
localities to 'vhich these Americans seek to return. 
"American missionaries also have been prevented from re-
turning to their stations in the lo·wer Yangtze 'Talley. Cer-
tain mission properties in this region 'vhich were for1nerly 
under occupation by Japanese troops are no'v reported to 
have been vacated as a result of Japanese troop transfers, 
and the missionary societies concerned feel it highly iinpor-
tant that their representatives reoccupy and preserve such 
properties. In view of the fact that Japanese civilians are 
freely permitted to go into and reside in such areas-as, 
for exan1ple, at Nanking 'vhere son1e eight hundred J apa-
nese nationals, including a substantial number of 'vo1nen 
and children, are reported to be in residence-it is difficult 
to perceive any 'varrant for the continued placing by the 
.T apanese authorities of obstacles in the 'vay of return by 
Americans 'vho have legitimate reason for proceeding to the 
areas in question. 
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"My Gover1unent is confident that the Japanese Govern-
ment cannot but concede that the infringement of and inter-
ference with American rights in China by the Japanese au-
thorities involved in the situation to 'vhich attention is 
herein brought are contrary to the repeated assurances of the 
tT apanese Govern1nent that the American rights will be 
respected; that the Japanese Government will take immedi-
ate steps, in keeping with such assurances, to cause the 
return to their rightful owners of the premises of the Uni-
versity of Shanghai and other American property under 
the occupation of Japanese armed forces; and that the 
Japanese Govern1nent "rill issue instructions to have re-
moved the obstacles jnterposed by the Japanese authorities 
in China against return by An1erican nationals to places such 
as those 1nentioned in the areas under Japanese military 
occupation." (Press Releases, Vol. XVIII, No. 453.) 
Airplctnes and pa.ct~fic blockade.-To date, there 
has not been a pacifie blockade in \Vhich airplanes 
\Vere emplo~yed, so that there are 110 precedents 
strictly applicable to the situation of the Safa in 
section (a) of this Situation. Applying the prin-
ciples of maritime blocl{ade, it would seem legal 
for the aircraft of state N to ask the Safa for 
identification. To do that would 11ot be violating 
the peace-ti1ne rights of state S which collld legally 
object to any further step amollnting to visit and 
search. If the Safa refuses to co1nply with the 
request for identificatio11, 1nay the airplane use 
force~ The treatises and precedents on this prob-
lem are exceedingly vague. In the view of the 
third party i. e. state S, any employment of force, 
eve11 to secure ide11tification, might seem to col1-
stitute an lln\varrantable interference \Vith its 
peaceful rigl1ts. But the objective of the blocl{-
ading state must be l{ept in Inind, and if Ullidenti-
fied vessels \Vere allo\ved to pass the bloch:ade, the 
entire n1easure of coercio11 n1ight be placed i11 
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jeopardy. It would be aski11g too much of the 
blockading state to forego 1neasures of coercion 
against the ships of third states n1 all cases where 
identification could not be obtained. It does not 
see1n UI1reasonable, therefore, to per1nit the appli-
catioll of force for the limited purpose of securing 
identi(y. To support this assertion tl1ere is the 
statement in Soule and ~IcCauley, "I11ternational 
Law" page 50, ''That States not Parties to the Pa-
cific Blockade * * * cannot complain because 
they are required to establish their identity in the 
ordinary manner.'' In the Naval War College 
Situations, 1932, page 95, it is also asserted that 
''The blockading force may take such measures as 
are 11ecessary for closing the port befoTe which it 
is n1aintaini11g a11 effective blockade.'' This last 
state111ent is extremely broad, is liable to misin-
terpretation, and should not be taken as implying 
any rights over third party ships other than tl1at 
of identification. 
In Situation (a), therefore, the aircraft has no 
authority to order the freighter about if it has ob-
tained identity. The conunand to lie to for 24 hours 
or until a crt1iser of state N arrives to visit ancl 
search the Safa, is absolutely unjustified. Even 
were this a war-time situation, such tactics by an 
airplane encountering a surface vessel 'vould ap-
pear to be illegal, as the discussion of Article 49 in 
the Jurists Report indicates. 
What are the rights of a surface blockading 
squadron as against aircraft flying over a pacific 
blockade~ ~Iuch the same type of reasonn1g is ap-
plicable here as that discussed imn1ediately above. 
The Noan, the cruiser of stateN, havingtherightto 
identify craft, acted legally in ordering the T-21 to 
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land at a nearby airport in order that its identitY 
and right to pass might be established. This in-
volves deviation on the part of the airplane, but 
such deviation of aircraft is essential as discussed 
in Situation I. It is 11ot lawful for an airplane to 
force a surface vessel to deviate, at least not yet, but 
an aircraft or surface vessel meeting an aircraft 
might well have to order deviation in order to effect 
its lawful purpose. To the possible objection that 
a blockade of the air maintained solely by sm"face 
ships could not constitute an effective blockade, it 
can be answered that surface vessels by their anti-
aircraft guns are capable of making passage over-
head extremely dangerous. Such a situation was 
definitely envisaged in Article 30 of the Jurists Re-
port. In this case the fact that the J\T oan hit the 
T-21 proves the effectiveness of the blockade in fact. 
For stateN to allow the flight of tlnidentified air-
planes over its blockade might well prove ex-
tremely risky and to ask a vessel of state N to 
withhold fire in such cases \Vould not make sense. 
The order of the Noan to the T-21 was not unrea-
sonable. .Airplanes are difficult to identify in the 
air, and military and commercial craft 11owadays 
look very much alike. As the landi11g field was 
11earby, no great inconvenience -vvas being asked 
of the T-21 which should have complied with the 
order. To the possible claim that the situation 
'vas not sufficiently serious to \varrant the firing 
upon a plane which in all likelihood wot1ld be 
seriously damaged if hit, the answer is the same 
as that given in Situation I. The pilot of the plane 
took his chances and must suffer the consequences . 
... t\_s \Vas stated i11 the case of U1~ited States v. 
Diekel11~a1~ (92 U. S. 520), "She volt1ntarily as-
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sumed the risl{s of her hazardous enterprise and 
must sustain the losses that follow * * * 
(She) ought to have known they kept the port 
closed to the exte11t necessary for the vigorotls 
prosecution (of the "'\var). '' Therefore, assuming 
that the Noa1L was really unaware of the T-21's 
identity, a11d assuming further that a proper com-
Inunications code was in effect (problem discussed 
in Situation I) so that the T-21 could reasonably 
be presun1ed to be aware of the sum1nons, the 
i.I1itial firing by the N oan "'\Vas lawful. This de-
cision is based upo11 the previously mentioned prin-
ciple that the blockading state may make reason-
able i11terference with the rights of third parties 
for the attainment of its objective, the ter1n "rea-
sonable'' being capable of interpretation in the 
light of the facts of an actual situation. 
The firing upo11 the T-21 after it had been forced 
to land, 'vas not justified. It was an excessive use 
of force 'vhich 'vas not 11ecessary for n1ilitary pur-
poses, ancl the Taftt shot1ld take energetic steps to 
protect the T-21 fron1 further damage. The rigl1t 
of self-preservation is here brought into play. 
Article 723 of U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.-The use of 
force against a foreign and friendly state, or against anyone 
'vithin the territories thereof, is illegal. 
'rhe right of self-preservation, ho,Yever, is a right w·hich 
belongs to states as "~en as to individuals, and in the case of 
states it includes the protection of the state, its honor, and its 
possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against 
arbitrary violence, actual or ilnpending, 'vhereby the state or 
its citizens n1ay suffer irreparable injury. The conditions 
calling for the application of the right of self-preservation 
cannot be defined beforehand, but 1nust be left to the sound 
jnd6rment of responsible officers, 'vho are to perform their 
duties in this respect "·ith all possible care and forbearance. 
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In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise 
than as an application of the right of self-preservation as 
above defined. 
It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the 
extent 'vhich is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end 
required. It can never be exercjsed with a vie'v to inflicting 
punishment for acts already com1nitted. 
General ]Jf''i1~ciple i1tvolved.-It cannot be re-
peated too often that in non-war situatio11s of force 
both the contestants and third states n1ust base 
their actions upon the con1promise principle of 
''reaso11able interference." The application of 
this principle makes for the avoidance of contro-
versy jn a realm where specific rules are almost 
wholly absent. Though the laJinen may feel that 
the bringing in of the word ''reasonable'' adds 
little clarity, students of the law k110w that courts 
and judges constantly have to deal with such mat-
ters as ''reasonable risl{'' and ''reasonable 1nan. '' 
These words acquire definite meaning 'vhen em-
ployed in actual situations. They are legal tern1s 
judicially interpreted. In International Situa-
tions like those here tlnder discussion, sensible 1nen 
do not and "\vill not find it unduly difficult to de-
cide what is "reasonable" when the legitimate 
needs of the state engaging in force meets the 
equally legitimate right of a third state under the 
i11ternational law of peace. The principle 1nay 
again be sumn1arized, this time in the words of 
P·rofessor Ellery C. Stowell (International Law, 
p. 555). 
Quasi-neutrals must tolerate such modifications of the usual 
relations as are reasonably necessary to apply the justifiable 
1neasures of reprisal and to effect the legitimate purpose in 
v1e''· 
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N on1n1"litary occupatio1~ and extrate1·r-itor-ial-
ity.-I11 the past there have been ma11y occtlpations 
of territory wl1en no \var has been declared~ I11 
occupations of this sort the ustlal rules regulating 
a military occupant's co11dt1ct have been held to 
apply. Tl1ough occupation, either "pacific" or 
military is 111ore than il1vasion and gives to the 
occt1pa11t certain rigl1ts incll1di11g that of securing 
the obedience of tl1e local })Opula tion, it does 11ot 
operate to transfer title to the la11d involved, or to 
terminate treaties. (See Note by Lester Woolsey, 
Arnerica11 J ot1rnal of Inter11ational I_ja,v, April 
1938, p. 319.) 
A 1nerican attit1tde to1vard Japanese occn pat ion 
of Chi1~a.-Follo\ving is the text of a letter fro1n 
the Secretary of State to Senator William H. 
Smathers: 
DECE:\IBER 18, 1937. 
MY DEAR SENATOR Sl\IATHERS: I have received your letter 
o£ December 13, 1937, in which you inform me that you 
favor the ·withclra,val o£ A1nerican ships and citizens £ro1n 
the area affected by the present conflict in the Far East. 
The question o£ the types and degrees o£ protection 'vhich 
this Governtnent should afford to its citizens abroad pre-
sents n1any difficulties and is one in regard to which opinions 
1nay very readily differ. In a situation such as has prevailed 
in the Far East there have been developed during 1nore than 
a century certain rights, certain interests, certain obligations 
and certain practices. In the light o£ peculiar features in-
herent in the situation, aJl o£ the lllajor po,Yers have devel-
oped and e1nployed, 'vith authorization by the Chinese Gov-
erninent, n1ethods for safeguarding the lives and interests 
and property o£ their nationals believed to be appropriate 
to the situation and 'varrantecl by the peculiarities thereof. 
Thus, for instance, there caine about and there is still jn 
existence the system o£ extraterritorial jurisdiction and vari-
ous o£ its concomitants. Concurrentl~y, 1nany nationals of 
this and other countries have, during seYeral generations, 
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gone to China, established themselves there in various occu-
pations and activities, and subjected themselves both to the 
advantages and to the disadvantages of the conditions pre-
vailing there, and the American Government has, along with 
other governments, accepted various rights and incurred var-
ious obligations. In a situation such as now prevails, many 
of our nationals cannot suddenly disavo'v or cut themselves 
off fro1n the past nor can the American Government suddenly 
disavow its obligations and responsibilities. The American 
naval vessels and the small contingents of American landed 
forces which have been n1aintained in China were placed 
and have been kept there solely for the purpose of assisting 
in the maintenance of order and security as affecting the 
lives, the property and the legitimate activities of American 
nationals, especially in regard to conditions of local disorder 
and unauthorized violence. These vessels and troops have 
never had in any sense any mission of aggression. It has 
long been the desire and expectation of the American Gov-
ernn1ent that they shall be withdrawn when their appropri-
ate function is no longer called for. 'Ve had thought a few 
1nonths ago that the opportune moment for such a with-
drawal was near at hand. The present, however, does not 
see1n an opportune 1noment for effecting that withdrawal. 
Officers of the .. A ..merican Government have repeatedly 
and earnestly advised American citizens, in face of dangers 
incident to residence in China, to withdraw and are making 
every effort to provide safe rneans 'vhereby they may de-
part. During the current situation in China the American 
1nilitary and naval forces have rendered important service 
in protecting the lives of American nationals, in assisting in 
evacuating Americans from areas of special danger, and in 
1naking possible the n1aintenance of uninterrupted communi-
cations 'vith our nationals and our diplomatic and consular 
establishments in the areas involved . 
.. A_s of possible interest in this connection there is enclosed 
a press release issued by the Department on August 23, 
1937, outlining the policy on which the Government is pro-
ceeding with reference to the situation in the Far East. 
I am very grateful for your courtesy in bringing to my 
attention your views in regard to the situation in the Far 
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East, and I assure you that we welcon1e at all times 
thoughtful vie,vs and comrnent on any phase of our foreign 
relations. -
Sincerely yours, 
CoRDELL HuLL. 
(Press Releases, Vol. XVII, No. 430.) 
At various tin1es during recent decades various powers, 
an1ong 'vhich have been Japan and the United States, have 
had occasion to con1municate and to confer with regard to 
situations and problems in the Far East. In the conducting 
of correspondence and of conferences relating to these Inat-
ters, the parties involved have invariably taken into con-
sideration past and present facts and they have not failed 
to perceive the possibility and the desirability of changes in 
the situation. In the making of treaties they have drawn 
up and have agreed upon provisions intended to facilitate 
advantageous developments and at the san1e time to obviate 
and a vert the arising of friction bet,veen and among the 
various po,vers which, having interests in the region or 
regions under reference, were and 'vould be concerned. 
In the light of these facts, and with reference especially to 
the purpose and the character of the treaty provisions from 
tilne to time solemnly agreed upon for the very definite pur-
poses indicated,. the Government of the United States de-
preciates the fact that one of the parties to these agree1nents 
has chosen to embark-as indicated both by action of its 
agents and by official statements of its authorities-upon 
a course directed to,vard the arbitrary creation by that 
power by methods of its own selection, regardless of treaty 
pledges and the established rights of other powers concerned, 
of a "new order" in the Far East. "\Vhatever may be the 
changes ""hich have taken place in the situation in the Far 
East and whatever may be the situation now, these matters 
are of no less interest and concern to the American Govern-
1nent than have been the situations which have prevailed 
there in the past, and such changes as may henceforth take 
place there, changes "~hich 1nay enter into the producing 
of a "ne"" situation" and a "ne'v order," are and will be 
of like concern to this Government. This Government is 
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'vell aware that the situation has changed. This Govern-
ment is also 'vell a ware that many of the changes have been 
brought about by action. of Japan. This Government does 
not admit, however, that there is need or 'varrant for any 
one power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be 
the terms and conditions of a "new order" in areas not 
under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository 
of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto. 
It is known to all the world that various of the parties to 
treaties concluded for the purpose of regulating contacts 
in the Far East and a voiding friction therein and there· 
from-,vhich treaties contained, for those purposes, various 
restrictive provisions-have from time to time and by pro-
cesses of negotiation and agreement contributed, in the light 
of changed situations, toward the removal of restrictions 
and toward the bringing about of further developments 
'vhich would 'varrant, in the light of further changes in the 
situation, further re1novals of restrictions. By such methods 
and processes, early restrictions ripon the tariff autonomy of 
all countries in the Far East 'vere removed. By such meth-
ods and processes, the rights of extraterritorial juris-
diction once enjoyed by occidental countries in relations with 
countries in the Far East have been given up in relations 
with all of those countries except China; and in the years 
immediately preceding and including the year 1931, coun-
tries 'vhich still possess those rights in China, including the 
United States, were actively engaged in negotiations-far 
advanced-looking to,vard surrender of those rights. All 
discerning and impartial observers have realized that the 
United States and other of the "treaty powers" have not 
during recent decades clung tenaciously to their so-called 
''special" rights and privileges in countries of the Far East 
but on the contrary have steadily encouraged the develop-
ment in those countries of institutions and practices in the 
presence of which such rights and privileges may safely 
and readily be given up; and all observers have seen those 
rights and privileges gradually being surrendered volun-
tarily, through agreen1ent, by the pow'ers which have pos-
sessed them. On one point only has the Government of the 
United States, along with several other governments, in-
sisted: namely, that new situations must have developed to a 
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point warranting the ren1oval of "speciaF' safeguarding 
restrictions and that the ren1ovals be efi'ected by orderly 
processes. 
The Govern1nent of the United States has at all times re-
garded agree1nents as susceptible of alteration, but it has 
always insisted that alterations can rightfully be made only 
by orderly processes of negotiation and agreen1ent among 
the parties thereto. 
The Japanese Government has upon numerous occasions 
expressed itself as holding si1nilar views. 
The United States has in its international relations rights 
and obligations which derive :fro1n international law and 
rights and obligations which rest upon treaty provisions. 
Of those which rest on treaty provisions, its rights and 
obligations in and 'vith regard to China rest in part upon 
provisions in treaties bet,,een the United States and China. 
and in part upon provisions in treaties bet,,een the United 
States and several other po,vers, including both China and 
Japan. These treaties were concluded in good faith for the 
purpose of safeguarding and pron1oting the interests not of 
one only but of all of their signatories. The people and the 
Govern1nent of the United States cannot assent to the abro-
gation of any of this country's rights or obligations by the 
arbitrary action of agents or authorities of any other 
country. 
The Govern1nent o:f the United States has, however, al-
ways been prepared, and is now, to give due and ample 
consideration to any proposals based on justice and reason 
which envisage the resolving of proble1ns in a. n1anner duly 
considerate of the rights and obligations o£ all parties di-
rectly concerned by processes of free negotiation and new 
con11nitlnent by and among all of the parties so concerned. 
There has been and there continues to be opportunity for 
the Japanese Government to put for"~ard such proposals. 
'I'his Government has been and it continues to be willing to 
discuss such proposals, i:f and when put forward, with rep-
resentatives of the other powers, including Japan and China, 
whose rights and interests are involved, at whatever time 
and in whatever place may be commonly agreed upon. 
J.APA:XESE OCCUPATION 79 
11! eanwhile, this Government reserves all rights of the 
United States as they exist and does not give a8sent to any 
in1pairment of any of those rights. 
JosEPH C. GREW. 
(Note to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, De-
ceinber 31, 1938. Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 483.) 
I desire also to call Your Excellency's attention to the 
fact that unwarranted restrictions placed by the Japanese 
military authorities upon American nationals in China-
notwithstanding the existence of American treaty rights in 
China and the repeated assurances of the Japanese Govern-
lnent that steps had been taken which would insure that 
_American nationals, interests, and properties would not be 
subject to unlawful interference by Japanese authorities-
further subject American interests to continuing serious 
inconvenience and hardship. R~ference is made especially 
to the restrictions placed by the Japanese military upon 
American nationals who desire to reenter and reocccupy 
properties from which they have been driven by the hostili-
ties and of which the Japanese military have been or still are 
in occupation. Mention may also be made of the Japanese 
censorship of and interference with American mail and tele-
grams at Shanghai, and of restrictions upon freedom of 
trade, residence and travel by Americans, including the use 
of railways, shipping, and other facilities. While Japanese 
merchant vessels are carrying Japanese merchandise between 
Shanghai and Nanking, those vessels decline to carry mer-
chandise of other countries, and American and other non-
Japanese shipping is excluded from the lower Yangtze on 
the grounds of military necessity. Applications by Ameri-
can nationals for passes which would allow them to return 
to certain areas in the lower Yangtze Valley have been 
denied by the Japanese authorities on the ground that peace 
and order have not been sufficiently restored, although many 
Japanese merchants and their families are known to be in 
those areas. 
(From the American Note to Japan, October 6, 1938. 
Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 4 7 4, p. 285.) 
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"Fou""R. Concerning the return of American citizens to the 
occupied areas, Your Excellency is aware that in North 
China there is no restriction, excepting in very special cases 
where the personal sn.Jety of those who return would be 
endangered, while in the Yangtze Valley large numbers of 
A1nericans have already returned. The reason why permis-
sion to return has not yet been made general is, as has been 
· repeatedly communicated to Your Excellency, due to the 
danger that persists because of the in1perfect restoration of 
order and also to the impossibility of admitting nationals 
of third po·wers on account of strategic necessities such as 
the preservation of military secrets. Again, the various 
restrictions enforced in the occupied areas concerning the 
residence, travel, enterprise and trade of .A.1nerican citizens" 
constitute the n1inimum regulations possible consistent with 
1nilitary necessities and the local conditions of peace and 
order. It is the intention of the Japanese Government to 
restore the situation to nor1nal as soon as circumstances 
permit. 
"FrYE. The Japanese Govern1nent were surprised at the 
allegation that there exists a fundamental difference between 
the treatment accorded to Japanese in America and the 
treatment accorded to Americans in Japan. "While it is 
true that in these days of e1nergency Americans residing in 
this country are subject to various econon1ic restrictions, yet 
these are, needless to say, restrictions imposed not upon 
Americans alone but also on all foreigners of all nationalities 
as well as upon the subjects of Japan. I beg to reserve for 
another occasion a statement of the views of the Japanese 
Government concerning the treatment of Japanese subjects 
in .A.1nerican territory, referred to in Your Excellency's note. 
".A .. s has been explained above, the Japanese Government, 
with every intention of fully respecting A1nerican rights 
and interests in China, have been doing all that could pos-
sibly be done in that behalf. However, since there are in 
progress at present in 0 hina military operations on a scale 
unprecedented in our historYt, it may well be recognized by 
the Government of the United States that it is unavoidable 
that these military operations should occasionally present 
obstacles to giving full effect to our intention of respecting 
the rights and interests of American citizens.'' 
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(:E"ro1n the Japanese reply, Nove1nber 18, 1938, to the 
preceding note. Press Releases, 'Tol. XIX, No. 477, p. 352.) 
Rules of (( tJacific'' occu pa.tio1~.-As \vith meas-
ures of force short of \Var in general, very few 
specific regulations exist concer11ing "pacific" oc-
Cllpation, but certai11 lines of conduct emerge from 
an analysis of past 1neasures of this sort : 
( 1) The coerced state retains title to the terri-
tory occupied and no legal change in sovereignty 
occurs withollt a definite treaty or without the 
'vorkings of the principle of prescription. 
(2) The occupant in his jurisdiction is limited 
to the right of garriso11 and of securing the safety 
of his troops on the territory occupied. This is 
fairly extensive jllrisdiction, however, for natu-
rally the occllpying authorities in looking after 
the security of their troops will have to assume a 
large measure of control. 
The problem, then, is to balance the il1terests 
involved, those of the occupant against those of 
third states and of the occupied state. As with 
military occupation, the local rules should continue 
in force ''as far as possible,'' that is, as far as the 
safety of the military forces allo,vs. This state of 
affairs is prescribed by Article 48 of Hague Con-
vention IV, of 1907, Respecti11g the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, and i11 Article VI of the 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field (1863), which reads: 
All civil and penal law shall continue to take its course 
* * * under martial la 'v * * * unless * * * 
stopped by order of the occupying 1nilitary po,ver. 
In an occupied area there are thus two parallel 
legal systen1s. The occupant applies his own law 
in all cases of cri1ne co1nmitted by his own officers 
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and men, in all cases of crimes against the army 
of occupation by any one in t~e area, and in all 
cases of \var crimes involving illegal attempts to 
interrupt lines of communication, to demolish 
bridges, to obstruct traffic, etc. The primordial 
right of self-protection gives the occupant this nec-
essary jurisdiction. In an exhaustive treatise, 
"Des Occupations Militaires en dehors Occupa-
tions de Guerre'' (Paris, 1913) by RaYJ-nond Robin, 
will be found a complete survey of the problems 
involved in "pacific" occupation. 
(3) When the two jurisdictions come into colli-
sion, that of the occupant necessarily has priority. 
This conclusion is based upon the practice followed 
in the pre-war instances of occupation. In many 
of these,. the occupying power clashed with the 
rights of third states established in extraterritori-
ality conventions. The occupant in each instance 
gave consideration to the stipulations of these 
treaties, but at certain times felt obliged because of 
military requirements to override the treaty rights. 
The occupation in itself, it should be remembered, 
did not abrogate these treaties which remained in 
force llntil arranged for by further negotiation. 
Occ·upat-iort and extrate1~ritoriality - P1~ece­
det~ts.-The French in Morocco in 1907 declared 
"the fact of occupation can11ot modify in any man-
ner the rules of procedure established by 
treaty, * * * at least in regard to infractions 
which do 1tot directly co1tcer1t the security of the 
occ-upying troops.'' (Robin op. cit., p. 546.) The 
famous Casablanca arbitration of 1909 involved a 
conflict between French troops and the German 
consular regime. Though the arbitral court ren-
dered a Solomon-like a"\vard which e11deavored to 
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placate both pa1·ties, the result really was favorable 
to the French whose military needs were recognized 
as taking precedence over all others. The court 
stated that it vvas \vrong for the German Consul not 
to recognize-
the rights of exclusive jurisdiction which appertain to the 
occupying state in foreign territory, as 'veil as in countries 
under capitulations, as regards the soldiers of the army of 
occupation, and the actions whatever they may be or from 
·wherever they 1nay con1e ''hich are of a nature to compromise 
its safety. (Deserters at Casablanca, G. G. Wilson, "The 
Hague Arbitration" Cases, p. 91.) 
Likewise i11 the occupation of Tunis in 1881, the 
French tried some Italians who were urging vio-
'Jence in the military courts and refused to turn 
then1 over to the Italian c9nsul who, the French 
alleged, would free them. (Robin op. cit., p. 671.) 
·During the occupation of Crete by an international 
army in 1897, the 1nilitary commanders were given 
complete jurisdiction over all offenses against the 
army, and Great Britain proclaimed the same rtlle 
\vhen Cyprus was occupied in 1878. An American 
was held u11der Frencl1 military jurisdiction in 
::Niadagascar in 1895, despite the provisions of the 
1881 consular treaty between the United States and 
:J!Iadagascar. A final example of this rule of prior-
ity for the occupying forces is to be found in Bis-
111arck's instructions to the German Consul in 
Samoa i11 1889 when he declared that the occupant 
had the right to defend himself by force against 
any threat to his safety. As sun1med up by Robin 
(ibid., p. 670) "In Capitulatio11s colmtries, the 
111ilitary jurisdiction is competent for all attacks on 
the security of the ar1ny of occupatio11." 
Applicatio1~ to the proble1n.-Though the forces 
of state N have occupied a large slice of state ~I, 
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the fundan1ental juridical status of the area l1as not 
changed. Titles still belong tq state M and the 
extraterritoriality treaty between state M and state 
T is still in force. The local la,vs of state T re-
I11ain in effect i11sofar as they are not inconsistent 
'vith the military needs of state ~I. The latter's 
rule is primary in all matters affecting the safety 
of its troops. If the nationals of state T had com-
mitted a crime or an act against the occupant, there 
'vould be 110 dot1bt as to the correctness of state N's 
position were that power to try the nationals in its 
military courts. In the problem presented, how-
ever, the nationals concerned are accused of crime 
against citizens of state M and thus 'vould seem to 
be eligible for trial by their own consul under the 
treaty, the security of N's forces apparently not 
being involved. It is a jurisdictional dispute which 
ought to be a 1natter of negotiation between states 
T a11d N. It is therefore pri1narily a diplomatic 
a11d not a naval problem. 
The Commander of the Tat~~ shot1ld remain close 
at hand, keeping in touch with the situation, and 
should notify the consul that he is ready to give 
protectio11 if the lives of the state T nationals are 
placed in jeopardy. He should not issue a11y pro-
vocative demands upon the N authorities. The 
situatio11 does not warrant such a drastic step 
which might involve state T in a difficult and em-
barrassing episode. Naval con1ma11ders should 
deal with local autl1orities through their own ac-
credited consular and dipiomatic re1)resentatives, 
and should threaten or use force in foreign coun-
tries only as a last resort dictated by the den1ands 
of self-defense. 
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On occasions " rhere injury to the United States or to citi· 
zens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the 
principles of international la'v or treaty rights, the com-
Inander in chief shall consult 'vith the diplomatic representa. 
tive or consul of the United States, and take such steps as 
the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to 
the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. ,._I'he responsibility 
for any action taken by a naval force, ho,vever, rests wholly 
upon the con11nanding officer thereof. (U. S. Navy Regula-
tions, Rule 722.) 
Resu1ne.-"'\!Vhen states employ force against one 
another i11 time of peace, whether such measures 
be called reprisals or son1ething else, international 
law is cOilfronted 'vith one of its most serious and 
difficult problen1s. The laws of war and neutrality 
cannot be Inade to apply in their entirety because 
tech11ically a state of peace still reigns. The peace 
is a disturbed one, hovvever, the contestants taking 
on son1e of the aspects of belligerents and third 
states becon1ing in reality qt1asi-neutrals. The 
ter111inology is apt to be very confusing becat1se the 
legal situation itself is so muddled. The problems 
arise as a restilt of the absence of an organized 
international government vvhich would decide ques-
tioi1S of damages, and which wotlld supervise law 
enforce1ne11t. Due to the lack of such a govern-
Inent, states have been in the habit of taking the 
law into their own hands under the theory of ''self-
-l:lelp" \vhich permits coercion \Vhen legally an in-
jury has been received. In practice, the Great 
Powers, the only states vvhich had effective force 
at their disposal, have abused the theory and have 
engaged in 111easures short of war against weaker 
nations ostensibly under the gt1ise of law enforce-
ment, but actually for political ends. 
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The weaker powers in such situations have usu-
ally 11ot cared or been able to regard st1ch meas-
ures as i11stituting a legal state of war. .As a re-
sult, considerable practice has accumulated in-
volving the procedures and tactics followed i11 
these "force i11 peace" relationships. Unable to 
co11trol the political use of force, international 
lawyers have accepted the practice and have for-
mtllated a few rules governing the de facto use of 
force. Since the framing of the League of N a-
tioi1S Covena11t and the ratificatio11 of the Pact of 
Paris (Kellogg-Bria11d Treaty) the problem has 
continued to be an acute one. States using 
n1ilitary and naval force agai11st other powers 
have been reluctant to tern1 their actions ''war'' 
because such a declaration wo11ld seem to identify 
them as violators of treaties which renounced or 
put restrictions upon the goi11g to war. Since 1920 
the only occasion upon which a participant in an 
international struggle has admitted that war was 
in progress was in 1933 whe11 on ~Iay lOth of that 
year Paraguay formally declared "\var on Bolivia. 
None of the actual contestants in tl1e Si11o-J ap-
a11ese or the Italo-Ethiopian co1Iflicts has admitted 
a war status, though during the latter embroglio 
the .American President ''found'' a war and most 
of the men1bers of the League decided that Italy 
had "resorted to war'' in violation of the Covenant. 
Governing these non-war sitt1ations there is very 
little in the \vay of specific rules. Certain general 
principles, bo\vever, are applicable, and though 
these may seem inconsistent with the laws of peace 
and not in harn1on~y with what many may regarrl 
as tl1e proper ends of law, they must be accepted 
for tl1e time being for lac}{ of anything better. The 
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1nost in1portant of these general principles is that 
'vhich specifies that the state employing force may 
interfere with the rights of third states to an ex-
tent reasonably necessary for the attainment of 
the military or naval objective. Quasi-neutrals 
1nust accept some inco11Venie11Ce. Examples of this 
11ecessary compromise bet\veeil the interests of the 
force-employing state and third parties is the right 
of the foTmer to identify all vessels and aircraft 
crossing a pacific blockade and the further right 
to use force to supple1nent this right of idei1tifica-
tion. Such an adjustn1ent affords the blockading 
state an adequate opportunity to pursue its objec-
tive and yet does not accord it the co1nplete bellig-
erent rights of visit and search. A state using such 
1neasures cannot expect all the advantages of bel-
ligere11cy if it is unwilling to assume its obligations. 
The Tight of identification is a reasonable con1pr0-
111ise for a non-war operation. 
In military occupation on land, when no \var 
~tatliS exists, a similar balancing of interests is pos-
sible. The occupant inevitably has priority in all 
matteTs relating to the security of its forces, but 
such rights do not include a termination of treaties 
or a complete suppression of the local laws. The 
guiding word in all this is ''reasonable'' which, 
though vague in the abstract, is capable of sensible 
i11terpretation in actual situations. 
SOLUTION 
(a) If the airplane is still with the Safa, the 
co1nmander of the Sogu should direct the Safa to 
lie to, should proceed to the Safa to protect it, and 
should notify the commander of the N forces that 
the Safa is a vessel of state S and is 11ot to be 
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molested, identificatio11 bei11g all that the Safct is 
legally required to ft1r11isll the_ airplane. If the 
airpla11e has left the Safa, the Sog,z~ should direct 
the latter to proceed into the port, and, if deemed 
esse11tial for the protectio11 of the Safa, tl1e Sogn 
should accon1pa11y it i11to the port. 
(b) The comma11der of the Tafu should 'var11 
the N oan that if tl1e latter continues to fire tlpOll 
the T-21, he 'vill fire 11pon the N oa,n to force it to 
desist. He should attempt to interpose the Tafu 
bet,veen the J\T oan and the airpla11e vvitl1 the object 
of halting the firing and shottld send out a sn1all 
boat to rescue the sttrvivors of the T-21. 
(c) The commander of the ~Paft~ should consult 
'vith the co11sul of state T at ~iottnt a11d shottld 
report the i11cident to his sttperiors i11 the Navy 
De1Jartme11t. A demand for the return of the 
nationals of state T or a threat of the 11se of force 
on tl1e part of the co1nn1ander of the Ta{n 'vould 
not be vvarranted by tl1e facts of this situation. As 
long as 110 immediate threat to the lives a11d pro1J:. 
erty of state T 11atio11als is involved, the 111atter is 
one for diplomatic 11egotiation bet,vee11 states T 
a11d N. 
